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The results of this study were originally presented at the 
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HCSmith/WGBernier/sjw Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. caused by ground fire hits on the aircraft); and others (reported casualties requiring segregation from the wounds and injuries). A serious attempt was made to exclude casualties resulting from accidents not involving ground fire hits.
Data indicate that injury type fatalities occur more frequently than wound tyPe fatalities.
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INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE
An out-candlng difference between the present conflict in Vietnam and al2. the previous wars of history is the use of the helicopter. Its full impact has not yet been completely recognized; its full exploitation in some roles remains controversial. Like all other weapon systems, serious changes in existing helicopters and proposed new machines must be justified by rigorous cost-effectiveness studies. Among other factors, survivability must be quantified and considered in the evaluation balance along with many other desirable characteristics such as performance, maintainability, etc.
Decisions and compromises among the various desirable characteristics
become more critical to the helicopter than perhaps to any other type of system for one main reason -weight. Weight is perhaps the overriding criterion to justify anything that goes on a helicopter -even for increased survivability. It therefore becomes more important and more critical than ever to strive for more data, more objectivity in data and more realism in its application.
The Ballistic Research Laboratories (BRL) have studied aircraft vulnerability for many years. Test data have been collected and mathematical predictive techniques have been developed which meet the criteria for objectivity perhaps even better than actual combat data. Unfortanately, the application of these developments requires assumptions to approach realism, and for this aspect there is no substitute fnr actual combat data. The analysis of the Vietnam data has provided many other side benefits in solving imediate survivability problems, but the main objectVTe of these studies by the BRL is to provide realism for the predictive studies.
(UNCLASSIFIED) THE COMBAT DATA AND ITS ANALYSIS Originally, the prime source of combat data for these studies was Each of the sources has provided key pieces of data; each has its limitations.
Combat data, like most other types of statistics on human operations, are by nature complex compared to experimental laboratory and field daca.
Strict control is humanly impossible, hence the processing requires considerable culling; herein lies a serious danger of defeating the main purpose of its collection and analysis.
To conserve the realism of the data, the authors attempted to code every possible item of information. A few years ago this philosophy of analysis would have produce4 an unmanageable monstrosity. The BRL highspeed computer, BRLESC, with its large memory capacity makes this type of analysis feasible. Comprehensive information recall programs are designed to accept all the data and produce hundreds of correlation tables of two or three parameters at a time. For instance, the date of the aircraft hit, number of hits, the components hit, altitude, speed, range, type of projectile, etc., and the results of each hit are coded, aud tables are produced correlating such things as frequency of hits by month, distribution of hits on an aircraft type, number of hits versus altitude, speed or both.
The analyses have been restricted, however, to only that data related to hits on aircraft (including flying personnel).
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!- By type, the casualties are arbitrarily classified into injuries, wounds and other. The wounds are casualties from direct hits on personnel by bullets, fragmeDts and other missiles including debris caused by perforation of the aircraft structure. The injuries are casualties due to injuries from crash (or hard landings) caused by projectile hits on vulnerable aircraft components. The "other" are miscellaneous casualties such as burns from rocket blast or hot gun barrels, wounds from ejected cases while on the aircraft; only one was fatal and little more need be said about these. The numbers of wounds ani injuries, on the other hand warrant considerable analysis. By severity, the casualties are classified into fatal, serious (but non-fatal) and superficial. Superficial implies "treated and returned to duty"; serious implies "hospitalized" in Vietnam or returned to the United States; fatal includes both fatal immediately and fatal later. A very significant observation is that more fatalities occurred because of crashes than because of direct hits on personnel.
CONFIDENTIAL
This observation implies that more fatalities could be prevented by protecting vulnerable components of the aircraft than by armoring personnel.
It probably also reflects the fact that during this period some of the pilots and copilots were provided with torso protection, but none of the aircraft were provided with critical component protection, which is now being provided even though there are serious objections to the added weight.
The main lessons to be learned are that ground-fire hits must be accepted as part of the environment of combat helicopters, and protection mist be 12 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL designed into them from the beginning to avoid weight penalties and costly retrofit programs and engineering changes at a later date.
The distribution of casualties by aircraft type is presented in the following As expected more casualties occurred on rotary wing aircraft because of their larger population than on fixed wing aircraft. Of the rotary wing, more occurred on the HU-l's than on all others. Of these, from other sources of combat data, it can also be shown that most of the casualties occurred on the armed escorts rather than on the unarmed * transports, in spite of the (approximate) two to one ratio in population of unarmed to armed.
13
CON FIDENT7IAL CONFIDENTIAL
The distribution of casualties by crew station is presented in the following The "Wound" category warrants considerable further examination. Table IV subdivides the wounds by location, i.e., head and neck, torso, legs, and arms. All but seven of the wound fatalities were caused by hits on the head, neck, and torso. (Two of the exceptions were exsanguination due to hits in the upper thigh and five fatalities due to "numerous wounds"
wnere the exact anatomical locations are unkown.) This finding seems to justify the ArnW policy of developing torso armor for application either to aircraft seats or directly on the personnel. Head protection presents a complex problem which has not been adequately solved. 
CONFIDENTIAL
Wound severity versus cause is presented in Table V . It is significant that all the fatal wounds were due to direct hits by projectiles, and no fatal wounds were caused by debris associated with perforation of aircraft structure. Since such debris is relatively easy to stop, with very little weight penalty introduced by the protective measures it should be possible to prevent most of the superficial wotnds and some of the serious wounds in the arms, legs, head and unarmored torso. The face wounds sugGest that the visors were not always worn. In searching for means tc reduce fatalities, ArnV agencies such as The curve representing Rotary Wing Aircraft Combat Support Sorties closely follows the trends of the curve for all Army aircraft and both curves can be considered as a "measure of exposure" to enemy fire.
The significance of the trends, as shown by the operations curves, becomes more meaningful when trends in wounds and injuries are studied.
In Figure 3 , which shows U. S. Arx casualties from wounds and injuries aboard aircraft, the "All Casualties" curve is similar in shape to the operations curves of Figure 2 . Thus, as the rate of exposure is increased, a corresponding increasing casualty rate is to be expected. A curve representing "Fatalities Only" is also shown in Figure 3 . This curve reflects the increased level of exposure, but shows a significantly lower rate of change. In order to explain the difference in the rates of change shown in the curves for "AI. Casualties" and "Fatalities Only", it is necessary to separate the casualties into "Wound" and "Injury" categories. The most frequent cause of forced landings was loss of oil from the engine system and from the transmission system. Test work on the UH-1
inidcates flight is limited to about 5 minutes after engine oil starvation and about 10 minutes .fter transmission oil starvation. When coupled wit% the fact that some force-landed aircraft have been destroyed on the ground by the VC, the significance of oil leaks becomes important.
Mission aborts resulted from a variety of dauses; perhaps the highest single cause reported was "personnel casualty".
Over 2,400 hits have been reported, and at least on the UH-1 practically every component and system have been hit. The rotor blades were hit over 200 times but in only a few cases did anything more than severe vibration result.
Among other things it was found that hits are uniformly distributed;
hence given a hit on the aircraft, the probability of hitting any section of the aircraft is predictable. Such a comparison is presented in Figure 1 .
(CON ENTIAL) OPRATIONS DATA
When hit data, casualty data, and aircraft "kill" data can be matched chronologically with operational data, such as number of aircraft sorties 
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CONFIDENTIAL
f.
Such risks appear tolerable and are in fact remarkably low. However, when one considers the hundreds of thousands of combat support sorties flown over Vietnam, the risks add up to significant losses of critical resources -both men and machines. When one further considers that the materials and techniques are available To eliminate most of the causes of loss, it becomes increasingly important to positively identify all the causes.
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